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Reasons and Passions 
T. M. Scanlon 
 
The pleasure and excitement of first reading “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a 
Person” are unforgettable. It is one of those rare articles that immediately strikes one as at the 
same time quite novel and yet clearly to be uncovering something that is obviously true, 
something that, without realizing it, we had been thinking all along. That article stimulated 
renewed attention to the question of when an action or mental state “belongs” to a person, and 
Frankfurt himself went on to pursue this question in a series of fine articles. He puts the problem 
very clearly in “Identification and Externality.” 
We think it correct to attribute to a person, in the strict sense, only some of the 
events in the history of his body. The others—those with respect to which he is passive—
have their moving principles outside him, and we do not identify him with these events. 
Certain events in the history of a person’s mind, likewise, have their moving principles 
outside of him. He is passive with respect to them, and they are likewise not to be 
attributed to him. A person is no more to be identified with everything that goes on in his 
mind, in other words, than he is to be identified with everything that goes on in his body. 
Of course, every movement of a person’s body is an event in his history; in this sense it is 
his movement, and no one else’s. In this same sense, all the events in the history of a 
person’s mind are his too. If this is all that is meant, then it is undeniably true that a 
passion can no more occur without belonging to someone than a movement of a human 
body can occur without being someone’s movement. But this is only a gross literal truth, 
which masks distinctions that are as valuable in the one case as they are in the other.
1 
 
Frankfurt is here criticizing a view put forward by Terence Penelhum, which emphasized 
the idea of “ownership” of one’s mental states according to which everything in a person’s 
mental life “belongs to him.” In this passage Frankfurt is suggesting that there is a “strict sense” 
of  attributability, narrower than the one Penelhum emphasizes, on which we should concentrate.   2 
This sense of attributability, or internality, is the quarry in many of Frankfurt’s articles, and it has 
proved to be an elusive one. In this paper I want to explore, in a tentative fashion, the question of 
why we should be interested in finding this quarry. It seems to me that there are at least two quite 
distinct kinds of reason for this concern, and that when they are distinguished the problem may 
look less difficult than it has seemed.  
When we are trying to characterize this narrower sense in which an action or attitude may 
or may not “belong to” an agent, we may be doing so with either, or both, of two aims in view. 
The first of these aims is to arrive at an understanding of the conditions under which an action or 
attitude is properly attributed to an agent as part of the basis for some assessment, moral or 
otherwise. When is an action or attitude something for which an agent is properly given credit or 
criticism? This is, of course, a question that can arise for the agent him or herself, since we can 
appraise our own conduct and character. But the second aim that I have in mind is one that is 
rooted more particularly in concerns of the agent. The question here is what makes a desire or 
other attitude fully a person’s own—his own in the sense that makes it constitutive of who he is? 
Each of these questions can be put in terms of freedom, or of an agent’s control over his 
actions and attitudes. The first is: what kind of control does an agent have to exercise over an 
action or attitude in order for the agent to be morally responsible for it (in order for it to figure in 
the proper grounds for moral or other appraisal of that agent)? The second question might be 
answered in terms of freedom: it may be said that what makes our actions, desires and attitudes 
truly ours is that we have the right kind of control over them. But this is not the only possible 
answer: desires may be said to be truly part of us in virtue of their role in our lives, or their 
relation to our other desires, rather than because they are freely adopted, or freely held. 
                                                             
1 The Importance of what We Care About, p. 61.   3 
In the case of Frankfurt’s famous unwilling addict, the two questions I have distinguished 
coincide: the addict is not morally responsible for taking the drug, and he suffers from a kind of 
internal unfreedom that is bad from his own point of view. Frankfurt gives us terminology to 
mark this distinction: the addict both acts unfreely and lacks free will, understood as the ability 
to have the will he wants. In the case of the willing addict the two come apart. The willing addict 
is morally responsible for taking the drug because he acts freely in doing so. But he lacks free 
will, since it is only a coincidence that the desire he acts from is one he wants to act on. In these 
cases the kind of conflict or control that is at issue in having “free will” is a matter of the relation 
between the addicts’ first-order desires and their higher-order volitions. In his later articles, 
however, Frankfurt raises a similar question about the relation between these higher-order 
elements: an agent’s having the will he wants is a matter of his identifying wholeheartedly with 
some of these elements rather than others. 
It has struck me in rereading Frankfurt’s articles that over the twenty-five years that they 
cover there has been a shift of emphasis from the first of these questions to the second—from 
concern with an agent’s “ownership” of his or her desires as a precondition of moral appraisal to 
a concern with an ideal of psychic health. In his early articles, a certain relation between first and 
second order desires is seen as a criterion of freedom. In his later work, a certain attitude toward 
our various desires—wholeheartedness—is investigated as something desirable in itself, quite 
independent of questions of freedom and of moral responsibility. What unites these works, 
however, is the question of when a desire or other attitude “belongs to” a person, and this is the 
question I want to examine.   4 
I 
I will begin by trying to distinguish various senses in which a state or action might 
“belong to me” and  will then consider the kind of significance that is to be attached to belonging 
or not belonging in these different senses. In order to discuss the senses in which something may 
belong to me, however, I have to begin with a few thoughts about who or what I am. 
I am, I take it, a conscious, rational, embodied creature. As a conscious creature, I have a 
stream of conscious thoughts and experiences. This stream is not continuous—it is interrupted by 
deep sleep and other periods of unconsciousness—but it is united by a degree of constancy in its 
elements, by the intentional content of these elements, and by its supposed causal basis. By the 
first of these, “constancy,” I mean such things as the high degree of continuity in my cognitive 
and affective reactions: in what I like and dislike, in what I believe and reject. By the second, I 
have in mind the way in which elements of my conscious life refer to each other, as when it 
seems to me that I am remembering a past experience or decision or carrying out a previously 
formed intention. It is a controversial question in discussions of personal identity whether the 
third element—the continuity of the causal basis of my mental life, has independent significance 
as a determinant of my identity. I will not take a stand on this general issue. But some particular 
ways in which the causal basis of one’s experiences may be relevant to their significance will 
figure in what I have to say later on. 
As Frankfurt points out at the beginning of “Identification and 
Wholeheartedness,” my mental life is not limited to my conscious life. Beliefs and 
aversions, for example, may be correctly attributed to me—may “belong to me in the 
sense or senses we are here concerned with—even though I am never aware of them. 
Despite this lack of awareness, they can be correctly attributed to me because they are the   5 
best explanation of my overall behavior—not only of what I do and think, but also of 
what I fail to think of. 
As rational creatures, we are capable of making judgments about reasons and hence of 
having judgment-sensitive attitudes such as belief and intention.
2 In calling these attitudes 
judgment-sensitive, I do not mean to suggest that they always arise from conscious judgment. 
My point is, rather, that it is part of the nature of such attitudes that, insofar as we are rational, 
we come to have them when we judge ourselves to have compelling reason of the relevant kind 
to do so, and cease to have them when we judge there to be compelling reason against them. 
Three features of our mental lives as rational creatures are particularly relevant for my 
purposes. First, it can seem to us that a certain consideration is a reason for some action or 
attitude. It may seem to me, for example, that the way a chocolate dessert would taste is a reason 
for having one tonight, or it can seem to me, when I am feeling annoyed with my colleague, that 
the fact that a certain incident presents him in a bad light is a reason for mentioning it in the 
department meeting. Second, as rational creatures we are capable of judging whether 
considerations that seem to us to be reasons actually are good reasons. I may decide, for 
example, that I do have good reason to have the chocolate dessert and that presenting my 
colleague in a bad light is not a good reason for referring to that incident in the department 
meeting. Third, it is often the case that we have what we judge to be sufficient reason for 
adopting any one of several attitudes or actions, and we are capable of choosing one of these 
over the others, for example, by adopting a certain aim, or forming an intention to pursue an aim 
in one way rather than another. For example, I may take myself to have good reason for pursuing 
any one of several careers. Given these reasons, I can adopt one of them rather than the others,   6 
and the fact that I have done, this affects the reasons I have, in the future, to do what is required 
in order to pursue it. I will refer to these familiar elements in our mental lives as, respectively, 
seemings, assessings, and optings. 
These familiar elements in a rational creature’s mental life are what they are not only in 
virtue of their phenomenal content when considered in isolation, but also in virtue of their 
normative and descriptive relations with other elements. If I have adopted the intention of doing 
something at a certain time, and have not reconsidered this, then, insofar as I am rational I do 
that thing at that time. If I have judged a certain consideration to count in favor of a certain 
intention or belief, then insofar as I am rational this consideration generally occurs to me as 
relevant when I am considering whether to adopt that attitude, and if I judge a consideration to be 
irrelevant to a certain attitude, then if I am rational I do not count it in favor of adopting that 
attitude. If I opt for a certain goal or intention, then insofar as I am rational this will seem to me 
to be a reason for acting in ways required to carry it out. 
These connections are not only a matter of consistency in conscious judgment but also a 
matter of what might be called the relation between my conscious and unconscious life. My 
taking something to be a reason is not just a matter of its seeming to me to be a reason when I 
present the question to myself and consciously reflect on it. The fact that I  take or do not take 
something to be a reason—the fact that I do or do not think my wife’s feelings are important, for 
example—will also show up in what occurs to me or fails to occur to me, in what I notice and 
fail to notice, and in what I feel and do “without thinking.” 
These connections have both a descriptive and a normative aspect. Descriptively, if these 
connections and others like them did not hold of me to a significant degree, then I would not be a 
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four paragraphs in Chapter 1 of What We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge, Mass.:   7 
rational creature, and attitudes of the kind I have described would not be attributable to me. But, 
considered normatively, these connections constitute a standard of perfect rationality that I often 
fall short of. I am only very imperfectly rational. I often fail to do what I judge myself to have 
compelling reason to do, and, more frequently than I would like, I count as reasons for action or 
other attitudes considerations that I actually believe do not, under the circumstances, count in 
favor of those attitudes. Considerations can seem to me to be reasons even when I have judged 
that they are not. 
Much more would of course need to be said to flesh out and defend this view of 
rationality. With these rather hasty observations as background, however, I want to return to the 
question of the various ways in which an attitude might or might not be attributable to me, and to 
the kinds of significance these attributions can have. I will start with the broadest contrast 
between two ways in which some action or attitude might be said to “belong to me.” The first is 
the sense involved in what Frankfurt called the “gross literal truth” that every passion and every 
action belongs to someone. This is the sense in which everything is attributable to me that occurs 
in my conscious life or figures in the best overall explanation of my conscious life and behavior. 
The class of things attributable to me in this broad sense includes conscious states such as 
judgments and decisions, visual perceptions, itches and pains, and also unconscious desires and 
beliefs that move me to do what I do. As I am understanding it, this sense of attributability is 
neutral as to the causes of these states. If any thoughts or desires have been produced in me by 
neuroscientists stimulating my brain, these are mine in the sense I am now describing, along with 
thoughts, itches, and pains produced in “normal” ways. 
In contrast to this broad sense of attributability, at the opposite extreme, is an idea of 
attributability according to which what is attributable to me are just my conscious choices, 
                                                             
Harvard University Press, 1998), esp. pp. 18-25.   8 
decisions, and the actions I am aware of performing. These, it might be said, are the things that I 
do, as opposed to others that merely occur in my mental life. 
It is easy to see why this class should seem particularly important if what we are 
interested in is the class of things that are attributable to a person for purposes of moral 
assessment. Since moral appraisal is appraisal of the way a person has governed him or herself—
appraisal which, for example, asks the person to explain his or her reasons for acting a certain 
way and to justify or make amends for that action—an agent’s conscious decisions are obviously 
of particular relevance for such appraisal. They are things for which he or she most obviously 
cannot escape responsibility. It is, however, a further question whether these are the only things 
that are attributable to a person in the sense that is a precondition for moral appraisal (let alone 
for other important purposes.) In fact, it is clear that this class is too narrow even for moral 
purposes. Negligence is a trivial example: we can be open to moral criticism for failing to take 
due care even when this reflects no conscious decision on our part. What negligence often 
consists in is just this: failure even to consider whether we were in a situation in which care 
needed to be taken. But the cases that are most likely to come to mind here are ones in which the 
negligence for which we are open to criticism involves action. We are criticized for what we do, 
or fail to do. It is a more controversial question whether we are open to moral criticism for 
attitudes that arise in us spontaneously, without any decision on our part, when these are contrary 
to the judgment we make when we consider the matter reflectively, and when this attitude has no 
influence on our action, perhaps because it is our reflective judgment rather than our immediate 
and unreflective reaction which governs our behavior. As Thomas Nagel says, “A person may be 
greedy, envious, cowardly, cold, ungenerous, unkind, vain, or conceited, but behave perfectly by   9 
a monumental act of will.”
3 I believe that states such as these are attributable to a person in the 
sense we are presently concerned with. I believe that they are relevant  to a moral assessment 
even if he disapproves of, rejects, and controls them, and would eliminate them if he could. (It 
remains, of course, a further question in  what way they should affect this assessment—how 
serious a fault this is, and how it compares with other failings.)
4  
Described in the language I introduced above, Nagel’s examples involve people to whom 
certain considerations regularly seem to be reasons for action even though they consistently 
judge on reflection that these are not good reasons. Even if it is conceded that such seemings 
“belong to the person” in the sense required for moral appraisal, there is the further question why 
this is so. Two related but distinguishable explanations occur to one. The first emphasizes the 
fact that even though these particular attitudes are, ex hypothesi, not under this particular agent’s 
control, they are the kind of thing that should, ideally, be responsive to his or her considered 
judgment—would be responsive to it if he or she were fully rational. As states that fall within the 
rational authority of the person’s judgment, they are things he or she is answerable for. 
The second explanation ignores (or at least does not directly appeal to) ideas of authority 
or control. It appeals rather to two other kinds of facts. The first is that the state in question is, we 
are assuming, one that does occur to the agent and occurs to him or her with some regularity. The 
second is that this state is of a kind that we have reason to care about: that whether these things 
seem to a person to be reasons or not is a factor that is significant in some way for our relations 
with him or her. These two explanations are closely related. States of the kind I have in mind 
have the significance just alluded to because they involve taking something to be a reason. 
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32.   10 
Insofar as they are such states they are the kind of thing that is in principle subject to control by 
the agent’s judgment. But they retain their significance even when this control is, in fact, absent. 
The fact that a person rejects a certain attitude—hatred or greed, for example—when it occurs to 
him makes a difference to our moral assessment of him. But the fact that it regularly occurs still 
makes a difference as well, whether or not it has any effect on his actions. 
This is even more obvious if we shift from moral appraisal to the appraisal of someone as 
a friend or lover. We might imagine, for example, a man who is in no doubt as to whether his 
wife’s feelings and interests are important to him. Nevertheless these considerations do not 
present themselves to him spontaneously as reasons. When he is making plans with others, he 
does not automatically consider how his wife would be affected and what she would prefer. But 
he is aware of this weakness, and carefully monitors himself—reminding himself to go back and 
consider how his wife would feel before making a final commitment. No doubt his wife would 
appreciate this if she knew about it, but I do not think she would be overly demanding if she 
regretted that it was necessary, and thought this a fault in her otherwise admirable spouse. What 
she would like best, not unreasonably, would be a husband to whom her interests occurred 
immediately and instinctively as important considerations. 
In moral assessment, as in this example of spousal loyalty and concern, both reflective 
and unreflective attitudes matter. Their relative significance may, however, be different in the 
two cases. The morality that applies between strangers, we might say, is in an important sense 
about self-regulation, and we expect it to involve checking one’s immediate responses. Certain 
kinds of negative attitudes toward others are moral faults, but it is an important and expected 
function of moral awareness to control such feeling. We do not expect purity from everyone. 
                                                             
4 This is argued very effectively by Angela Smith  in Agency, Attitude, and Responsibility 
(PhD dissertation, Harvard University 1999). I am much indebted to her for discussion of   11 
Relations of love and friendship are another matter. It is not just that we owe those we love a 
kind of concern that others cannot expect. It is also important (not just an ideal) that this kind of 
concern should be, to a large degree, a matter of immediate and spontaneous feeling. 
So the relative significance of spontaneous response and reflective judgment is different 
in the two cases. Given the importance of spontaneous reactions in the case of friendship, 
however, it would be odd to say that these reactions do not fully belong to the person. If, in the 
moral case, these reactions are less significant than reflective judgments, this must be for some 
other reason. 
This leads me to conclude that the elements of a person’s mental life that are atrributable 
to him or her in the sense required for them to be potential grounds of moral assessment include, 
at least, all of a person’s judgment sensitive attitudes. (Indeed, the argument I have just 
concluded may suggest that more than this is included. The attitudes we have reason to care 
about in those whom we love may include some that are not judgment-sensitive. If so, then if 
these are not morally significant it cannot be because they do not belong to the person.) 
So let’s turn to the other extreme—the broadest sense in which every element of a 
person’s mental life “belongs to him.” Are there things that are part of a person’s mental life in 
this broadest sense but that we should say do not “belong to the person”—are not properly 
attributable to him—in the sense that is relevant to moral criticism or to other related forms of 
assessment, such as assessment as a friend? 
What about itches and pains, for example? That a person feels an itch or a pain is clearly 
not a morally significant fact about him. But why is this so? Such sensations are not morally 
significant because they do not have the right content—they do not indicate anything about the 
person’s attitudes towards others. It is also true that they are not the kind of things that even in an 
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ideally rational agent would be under the control of reflective judgment. So we cannot draw any 
conclusions from their occurrence about judgments that the person holds. But what is primary 
here—the lack of significant content or lack of control? 
To answer this question, it may help to consider our reactions to science-fiction examples 
in which mental states are produced by neural stimulation, since these are, it is imagined, states 
with potentially significant content but without the right kind of control. Suppose a neuroscientist 
were, by stimulating a person’s brain in the right way, to cause him, momentarily, to feel deep 
hatred for certain people and to see harm to them as something to be promoted. I think we would 
all agree that the occurrence of these feelings is not morally significant. Why not? One reason is 
that the fact that he responds to neural stimulation in this way does not tell us anything 
interesting about this person. Anyone would react in the same way. Moreover, what we are told 
about the causal origin of this response means that the fact that he responds in this way gives us 
no basis for inference about what the person was “really like” at other times, hence no reason to 
reexamine or reinterpret his past behavior. 
But now suppose that the effect of what the neuroscientist does is more than momentary. 
She changes the person so that in future he becomes upset and angry whenever he sees the 
people in question and angry when he hears that things are going well for them. Perhaps he still 
believes, on reflection, that these feelings are unjustified and morally disreputable, but he has 
them nonetheless. This would, I believe, constitute a morally significant change in what the 
person is like. He has become a worse person, morally speaking, just as much as he would have 
if the change had occurred “naturally” that is to say, without the neuroscientist’s intervention, 
perhaps as an overreaction to some bitter disappointment combined with some unpleasant   13 
interactions with members of the group in question. What matters is the content of the attitudes, 
not their origin or susceptibility to rational control. 
 
II 
I want now to consider how the framework I have described for discussing these matters 
compares with that employed by Frankfurt in various of the papers in the series I have 
mentioned.  
In “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person” he operates mainly with the 
notion of desires of different orders. Desires of the first order seem to be understood, as 
far as I can see, simply as motivationally efficacious states. Higher-order desires differ 
from first-order ones simply in having a different kind of object. The object of a first-
order desire is some state of affairs that one might bring about through action. The object 
of a second-order desire is also a state of affairs, but in this case a state that involves 
one’s having or not having some first-order desire. A second-order volition is a particular 
kind of second-order desire, namely a desire that a particular first-order desire be the one 
that moves us to action. But while second-order desires and volitions are distinguished in 
this way by their objects, they remain, it seems, desires—that is to say, simply 
motivationally efficacious states. So a second order volition that I act out of loyalty is a 
state that moves me to bring it about that I act in this way. 
First-order desires can conflict with each other when their objects are 
incompatible. Second-order desires can conflict in this way with first-order desires (my 
desire to act out of loyalty may conflict with my desire to avoid danger, if what loyalty 
prompts me to do is to take a risk.) But second-order desires, or at least second-order   14 
volitions, can conflict with first-order desires in a further way, namely the way in which a 
first-order desire can conflict with a force in the world that works to prevent its 
fulfillment. Just as, for example, a shift in the tide can conflict with my desire to sail to 
the harbor quickly, by making this desire more difficult to satisfy, so my desire for safety 
can conflict with my second-order volition to act out of loyalty, by making it more 
difficult for me to do this. 
Neither of these forms of conflict is the same as the kind of conflict that can occur 
between what I called above a seeming and an assessment—that is to say, the kind of 
conflict that occurs when it seems to me that showing my colleague in a bad light is a 
reason for mentioning a certain incident in a department meeting but I judge this not in 
fact to be a good reason for doing so. In order for this kind of conflict to be possible, the 
conflicting elements must involve conflicting claims, not just incompatible motivational 
tendencies or ways the world might be. Desires can enter into such conflicts if, as I 
suggested above, they involve “seemings”—if having a desire that X involves taking 
some feature of X to make it worth pursuing, but I do not see how they can do so 
otherwise. 
Frankfurt’s terminology in later work is somewhat different from what I have 
described above.  In “Identification and Wholeheartedness”, for example, he responds to 
Watson’s charge that decisive identification with a desire seems arbitrary by emphasizing 
that what he calls “decisive commitment” should be understood as a decision, and one 
that the agent makes for a reason.
5 It is noteworthy, I think, that Frankfurt then goes on to 
distinguish two kinds of conflict between desires. Conflict of the first kind occurs when 
two desires compete for priority. Each is trying to prevail in the struggle to determine the   15 
agent’s course of action, and the resolution of this conflict requires the establishment of 
an order between them. One of them must take precedence in the determination of action, 
but even when this is established both remain, in the fullest sense, the agent’s desires. 
Conflict of the second kind is deeper. Its resolution, he says, “involves a radical 
separation of the competing desires, one of which is not merely assigned a relatively less 
favored position but excluded entirely as an outlaw.”
6 
Frankfurt does not say exactly what he has in mind here, but the examples that 
come to my mind are conflicts of the deeper sort described above, which I called conflicts 
between seemings and assessments. If I judge that, on reflection, what seemed to me to 
be a reason for a certain attitude is not in fact such a reason, then my initial tendency to 
see it as a reason is overruled, and in this sense rendered an “outlaw.” Conflict may 
remain, however, if the “outlaw” attitude does not surrender but remains within the 
person’s psychic territory, defiant. This kind of conflict is certainly a common feature of 
our mental lives. The question is how it is best described 
Frankfurt is clear that this kind of conflict can occur only between higher-order 
desires. He says, in “”The Faintest Passion” that “conflicts involving first-order psychic 
elements alone—for example, between an attraction and an aversion to the same object—
do not pertain to the will at all. They are not volitional but merely impulsive or 
sentimental. Conflicts that pertain to the will arise out of a person’s higher-order, 
reflective attitudes.”
7 But if first-order desires count as such “first-order psychic 
elements” and are thus merely impulses or sentiments, it seems to follow not only that 
they cannot conflict with each other in a deeper sense but that they cannot conflict with 
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higher-order volitions either. If first-order desires are only competing impulses and do 
not involve “seemings” then they cannot be overruled and hence cannot be declared to be 
“outlaws,” except in the sense in which my fatigue is an outlaw if it interferes with my 
ability to do what I take myself to have reason to do. 
This suggests to me the possibility that I may have, for years, been misreading 
Frankfurt’s talk of first- and second-order desires. As I have said, I understand a desire, in 
the most familiar and ordinary sense, as involving a tendency to see some consideration 
as a reason. This seems to me to fit with my experience of “conflict situations”: even 
when I declare some desire, such as the desire for another drink, to be an “outlaw” the 
kind of force that it continues to have involves not just an unruly impulse but a tendency 
to see something as a reason. So I have always understood Frankfurt’s example of the 
unwilling addict on this same model. I assumed that this addict is moved to take the drug 
by the thought of how good it would feel to do so, and that the pleasure, and relief from 
his pain, that taking the drug would bring keep presenting themselves to him as reasons to 
shoot up, even though he judges, without reservation, that these are not, under the 
circumstances, good reasons. But of course there is a more radical understanding of the 
case, according to which the addict feels a strong urge to take the drug but sees no reason 
to do so. When he takes the drug, he is thus not acting on a reason at all, but only being 
overpowered by an impulse. I would not deny that there could be such a case, but it 
seems much more unusual than the phenomenon I have (mistakenly, I now think) 
understood the example to describe. Moreover, if desires are understood in the way this 
reading of the example suggests—as mere impulses—this seems to deprive them of the 
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normative force we are accustomed to attribute to them in both conflict and non-conflict 
cases. 
But this view of first-order desires does seem to be the one that Frankfurt takes in 
other work as well. In “Autonomy, Necessity and Love,” for example, he says that 
passions such as jealousy and craving “do not include any affirmative or negative 
volitional attitudes toward the motivational tendencies they in which they consist.” He 
then continues, 
However imposing or intense the motivational power that the passions mobilize 
may be, they have no inherent motivational authority. In fact, the passions do not 
really make any claims upon us at all. Considered strictly in themselves, apart 
from whatever additional impetus or facilitation we ourselves may provide by 
acceding to them, their effectiveness in moving us is entirely a matter of sheer 
brute force. There is nothing in them other than the magnitude of this force that 
requires us, or that even encourages us, to act as they command.”
8 
 
It seems, then, that for Frankfurt, although first- and second-order desires are both 
called desires, they are really quite different sorts of things—different in the kind of 
authority they claim and in the ways they can conflict. My view of desires (sans phrase) 
is akin to Frankfurt’s view of higher-order desires. I believe that it is essential to what we 
most commonly call a desire that having a desire involves something’s seeming to us to 
be a reason. So, for example, when I feel a desire for a piece (or a second piece) of rich 
chocolate cake, its delicious taste and the pleasure it would give me seem to me to be 
reasons for eating it. When I feel a desire for revenge against my rival, the fact that   18 
something I could do would cause him embarrassment strikes me as a reason to do it. Not 
every case of something seeming to me to be a reason is a case of desire, however. I can 
see that the fact that exercise would improve my health is a reason to engage in it. But I 
have no desire to exercise. My wife, on the other hand, exercises for the reason just 
mentioned—to improve her health—and she has a strong desire to do so. The difference 
between us, at least in part, is that the prospect of improving her health in this way 
presents itself to her insistently and effectively as a reason. She has what I call a desire in 
the directed-attention sense. But while this fact of directed-attention explains the 
motivational difference between us, it is not itself a source of motivation. What moves 
her is a consideration she takes to be a reason—the prospect of improving her health. 
Given that I hold this view, Frankfurt’s characterization of what is absent from 
these passions as he understands them strikes me as peculiar. He says that passions “do 
not include any affirmative or negative volitional attitude toward the motivational 
tendencies in which they consist.” This suggests that what is missing from a passion 
itself, and could be added by a higher-order attitude, is something like approval of the 
passion, or a desire to be moved by its motivational power. But neither of these gets at 
what I see as crucial. Suppose I am a teacher in a school and I feel a strong desire that a 
certain pupil not get a leading role in the school play. Her father is my hated rival, and I 
can’t stand the thought of the pleasure that it would give him to see her in this role. I may 
judge that this is not in fact a good reason to deny the child the part. I may feel only 
“disapproval” of the “motivational tendency” of this vengeful thought, and no desire to 
be moved by it. Yet it is crucial to the “motivational tendency” that it retains that when I 
think of the play, the pleasure the father would derive from seeing his daughter in the 
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limelight keeps presenting itself to me as a reason to prevent this from happening. The 
claim that this desire has on me is not a matter of my approval or endorsement, but of the 
fact that it consists in something seeming to me to be a reason, even though I judge that it 
is not. 
I disagree with Frankfurt, then, at least in holding that most of what we commonly 
call desires are not first-order desires as he characterizes them. Perhaps this just means 
that desires as I understand them, and what I have called seemings, are already higher-
order phenomena. It is less clear, given the passage discussed in my previous paragraph, 
how far Frankfurt and I agree about what is essential to these higher-order attitudes. I 
would not put this in terms of approval and disapproval, but in terms of judgments about 
what is a good reason and which good reasons to act on. Whether there is disagreement 
here or not, what I want to do in the remainder of this paper is to show how, using the 
language of reasons, I would account for some of the things Frankfurt says about 
necessity, freedom and love. 
III 
At the beginning of the paragraph that contains the remarks about jealousy and 
cravings that I quoted above, Frankfurt contrasts these passions with an agent’s higher-
order attitudes. He writes, “The volitional attitudes that a person maintains toward his 
own elementary motivational tendencies are entirely up to him.”  It is certainly common, 
and natural, to say that the things that belong most clearly to a person are the things that 
are “up to him.” But it is also correct to say, as Frankfurt does repeatedly, that it is 
essential to being a person that certain things—the things one cares most deeply about—
strike one with necessity, as things one must care about. This may sound paradoxical, but   20 
it becomes clear that there is in fact no paradox when we ask what is involved in 
something’s being “up to us.” 
Consider what I have called seemings, assessings, and optings. In what sense are 
these “up to us,” and in what way are they, on the contrary, forced upon us? One sense (a 
morally important sense, I believe) in which something can be up to us is if it depends on 
and hence reflects our judgment. Assessings—our reflective judgments about whether 
certain considerations do or do not count in favor of certain attitudes—are certainly up to 
us in this sense. They are our judgments and hence, trivially, they would be different if 
our judgments were different. But from the fact that it is up to me in this sense to decide 
whether something is a reason for a certain action or not, it does not follow that I am free 
to choose either answer. It is up to me to decide whether the fact that I would break many 
bones if I were to jump from a moving car counts against opening the door and leaping 
out at the next turn, but I do not, in another sense, enjoy much freedom in forming this 
decision. Under the circumstances the answer is so clear that I couldn’t decide 
differently. I am constrained by my perception of the relevant reasons. 
Seemings—desires and other states in which considerations appear to me to 
constitute reasons—are a slightly different case. In one sense, they are not up to me since 
they do not always arise from my judgment. But since they involve tendencies to see 
things as reasons, they implicate my judgment. If I were fully rational, then when I judge 
something not to be a good reason it would cease to seem to me to be one. Alas, we do 
not invariably have this kind of control. Not only can we not command the “vasty deep” 
of our (first-order) passions as Frankfurt understands them,
9 we cannot always command 
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our instinctive judgments. But they are ours nonetheless, and can reflect something about 
us even when we reject them. 
With respect to optings we have an additional degree of freedom. If there are 
good reasons for me to choose either of two careers, it is “up to me” in a further sense 
which of them I take up. I can choose either way, and whichever way I choose will be 
supported by reasons but neither choice is compelled by them. The important point, 
which Frankfurt emphasizes, is that this extra degree of freedom does not bring with it an 
added degree of responsibility. Nor does its absence in the other cases—the fact that 
these judgments are more constrained by reasons and hence less “up to us” in the further 
sense we are now discussing—make these judgments less fully attributable to us. It is 
inviting to think that the self is more fully revealed in choices that are less constrained. 
That this is not always so is due to the fact that what we and others regard as particularly 
significant about us is the considerations we regard as reasons and how we respond to 
them. (Here I return to a point made earlier about significance.) Statements such as “He 
couldn’t help it” or “He could not have done anything else” serve to mitigate 
attributability when the necessities alluded to are ones that prevented the agent’s 
assessment of certain reasons from determining his action. So the action does not show 
that he failed to care about these things. In other cases, such as Martin Luther’s, the same 
words serve to underscore the degree to which the action was the agent’s, because it 
reflected what he took to be compelling reasons. 
It thus seems to me that the framework I have described can give an entirely 
adequate account of the phenomena of volitional necessity that Frankfurt discusses. He 
describes, for example, the case of Lord Fawn, in The Eustace Diamonds who “had   22 
thought that it would be a good idea” to interrogate Andy Gowran, a lower class estate-
steward, about the behavior of Fawn’s fiancée on a certain occasion.
10 But when he tries 
to do this “every feeling of his nature” revolts against it, and he finds that he cannot 
continue the conversation. What happens in this case, as I would describe it, is that the 
fact that his intended plan of action would involve discussing such an intimate matter 
with a coarse person of low class strikes Lord Fawn as an absolutely compelling reason 
against it. As a conclusion about the reasons he has, this judgment is “up to him” in the 
first of the senses I distinguished. (As Frankfurt says, “It is not against his will that 
Fawn’s feelings revolt.”) But he is nonetheless not free to reach an opposite conclusion, 
and this “necessity” is, as I pointed out above, a common feature of our judgments about 
reasons. 
Let me turn, in closing, to say something about love, which Frankfurt discusses in 
several of his most recent articles. He is concerned here with love in a broad sense, 
including not only emotional love for another person but also other deep commitments 
such as to a place, a cause, or an ideal. Just as I said above about desire, I believe that 
love in this sense essentially involves seeing certain considerations as reasons. To love 
something, as Frankfurt says, is to be guided in a certain way by what is good for, or 
required by, it. Explaining love in terms of reasons may seem hyper-rationalistic. But it 
seems this way, I believe, only if we fail to distinguish between what love involves 
(which is what I have been discussing) and the grounds of that love. At least in the case 
of emotional love, there is often something inappropriate about giving reasons for loving 
or to think that one needs to give reasons for doing so. (It would not, in a similar way, be 
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inappropriate to offer a justification for valuing. There is generally a reason why 
something is valuable.)
11 
As Frankfurt observes, although love is a contingent matter, it involves a kind of 
volitional necessity—the lover feels that he or she must do certain things.
12 “The claims 
of love … possess not simply power but authority.”
13  He contrasts this authority with the 
necessities of reason and duty. I agree that these are different in content. In particular, the 
requirements of love are not properly understood as a special case of moral obligation. 
But I would not say, with Frankfurt, that the authority of the demands of love can be 
traced to the claims of one’s identity as a person. He writes that in betraying the object of 
one’s love one therefore betrays oneself as well.
14  If this is correct, it is only when 
particular stress is put on as well. Otherwise, it seems to misdescribe the (no doubt 
somewhat elusive) division of normative labor between elements that are contingent or in 
some cases voluntaristic and those that are neither. On the one hand, it is quite true that I 
can only betray an ideal or beloved if it is my ideal, or my beloved. (This is the contingent 
part.) But when it comes to the crunch, it seems to me that the authority of an ideal comes 
from my sense of its value, and the thought of betraying my beloved is devastating 
because it is she whom I would betray. Thoughts about my commitment to either, or my 
integrity as a person, seem secondary, and a little too self-referential. This relative 
emphasis seems, if anything, clearer when the object of love is a person than when it is an 
ideal. In the latter case, appealing to my commitment as a source of authority seems less 
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out of place. This is surprising, since love of a person need not be justified, and the 
adoption of an ideal is more likely to be based on reasons. One might therefore expect 
these reasons to play a larger role in explaining authority in the latter case. I don’t have 
an explanation for this puzzle. 
The view I have been advocating, which finds the motivating force of desires, and 
now even that of the claims of love, in reasons, may seem absurdly hyper-rationalistic. It 
may seem to extend the authority of Reason over other aspects of life in way that is very 
implausible. But I have said nothing about Reason, as a faculty. I have spoken only of 
reasons. I have claimed that desires are best understood as involving taking something to 
be a reason, but I do not mean by this to suggest that there is some calculative process of 
reasoning through which we should decide what to desire. What I am offering should not, 
then, be seen as a defense of the claims of Reason against passion. I am suggesting, 
rather, that the idea of an opposition between Reason and passion is misconceived. If 
desires are not to be mere urges, as most of them are not, they must involve seeing 
something as a reason. So if Reason is involved in every attitude concerning reasons, 
passion and Reason cannot be two separate capacities.
15 
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